Abstract-A fundamental challenge in multiagent systems is to design local control algorithms to ensure a desirable collective behavior. The information available to the agents, gathered either through communication or sensing, naturally restricts the achievable performance. Hence, it is fundamental to identify what piece of information is valuable and can be exploited to design control laws with enhanced performance guarantees. This paper studies the case when such information is uncertain or inaccessible for a class of submodular resource allocation problems termed covering problems. In the first part of this paper, we pinpoint a fundamental risk-reward tradeoff faced by the system operator when conditioning the control design on a valuable but uncertain piece of information, which we refer to as the cardinality, that represents the maximum number of agents that can simultaneously select any given resource. Building on this analysis, we propose a distributed algorithm that allows agents to learn the cardinality while adjusting their behavior over time. This algorithm is proved to perform on par or better to the optimal design obtained when the exact cardinality is known a priori.
I. INTRODUCTION

S
EVERAL social and engineering systems can be thought of as a collection of multiple subsystems or agents, each taking local decisions in response to available information. A central goal in this field is to design control algorithms for the individual subsystems to ensure that the collective behavior is desirable with respect to a global objective. Achieving this goal is particularly challenging because of the restriction on the information available to each agent and to the large scale of typical systems. Examples include, but are not limited to, power grid networks [2] , charging of electric vehicles [3] , transportation network [4] , task assignment problems [5] , sensor allocation [6] , and robotic networks [7] . A considerable bulk of the research has focused on the design of local control algorithms in a framework where the information at agents' disposal is itself a fixed datum of the problem. A nonexhaustive list includes [8] , [9] , and references therein. Understanding the impact of information availability on the achievable performance is a seemingly important but less tracked problem [10] - [12] .
Of particular interest is to recognize what supplementary piece of information could coordinate the agents to improve the system performance, and, further, how to incorporate this additional knowledge into a control algorithm. It is important to highlight that providing each agent with all the information available to the system is in principle beneficial, but not necessarily desirable. Indeed, the communication costs associated with propagating additional information through the system might overcome the performance gains that the knowledge of additional information gives. Therefore, the previous question has to be understood within this context. Ideally, one is interested in a piece of information that gives a significant performance enhancement and is simple to obtain. Loosely speaking, we measure the value of an additional piece of information with the performance gain that the best controller can offer, using that supplementary piece of information.
Relative to the class of resource allocation problems termed covering problems, [11] , [13] show that the maximum number of agents that can simultaneously select a resource (which we term cardinality) constitutes a valuable piece of information. More precisely, when the system operator is aware of the cardinality of the problem, he can devise distributed algorithms with improved performance guarantees. Nevertheless, the knowledge of the exact cardinality is in many applications uncertain, not available, or may require excessive communication to be determined. Following this observation, a system operator would like to understand how to operate when the knowledge of the exact cardinality is not available. What is the risk associated with using the wrong cardinality in the control design? What is the reward for using the correct one? Further and more fundamental: when the cardinality is not available at all, can the agents learn it while simultaneously adjusting their behavior?
This paper proceeds by considering covering problems [14] , [15] , a class of resource allocation problems, where agents are assigned to resources in order to maximize the total value of covered items. Examples include vehicle-target assignment problems [16] , sensor allocation [6] , task assignment [17] , etc. Due to the inherent limitations in sensing and communication, in all these applications the control algorithms are required to rely only on local information. Thus, we model distributed covering problems as strategic-form games, where the system operator has the ability to assign local objective functions to each agent. Indeed, as shown in [10] and [18] , game theory lends itself to analyze distributed systems where individual agents adjust their behavior in response to partial information. Such game theoretic approach offers the possibility to build upon existing tools to quantify the system performance as well as the opportunity to exploit readily available algorithms to compute equilibria in a distributed fashion [5] , [13] . The overarching goal of the system operator is to design local utilities in order to render the equilibria of the game as efficient as possible. Agents can then be guided toward an equilibrium of such game by means of existing distributed algorithms [5] , [19] . It is important to highlight that we are not modeling agents as competing units, but we are rather designing their utilities to achieve the global objective.
Building on the previous results of [11] , [13] , we contribute as follows.
1) We study the problem of optimally designing the utility functions in the case when the true cardinality is not known, but only an upper bound is available. 1 We further perform a risk-reward analysis in the case when the information on the cardinality of the game is uncertain. When the goal is to guard the system against the worst case performances, the right choice is to design the utilities as if the true cardinality was the given upper bound. Different designs will offer potential benefits, but come with a certain degree of risk. These results are presented in Theorem 1. 2) Motivated by the potential advantages and inherent shortcomings presented in the risk-reward analysis, we propose a distributed and asynchronous algorithm that dynamically updates the utility functions while agents adjust their behavior over time. Such algorithm requires no initial information, and is certified to perform on par or better (in a worst case sense) to the optimal design possible, had we known the cardinality in the first place. These results are summarized in Theorem 2. 3) We compare, instance by instance, the performance of the proposed learning algorithm with the performance of the optimal design obtained with full knowledge of the cardinality. We show that it is not possible to deem one approach superior to the other on all instances of covering problems; in that there are instances where one outperforms the other and the converse too. These results are presented in Theorem 3.
1 A simple bound is given by the number of agents.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the covering problem, its formulation as a strategic game, and the metric used to measure the system-level performance. Section III studies the utility design problem when a sole upper bound on the cardinality is available and presents the riskreward tradeoff associated with the use of uncertain information. Section IV shows the possibility of dynamically adjusting the utility functions to improve the performance. Section V provides numerical simulations and concludes this paper.
I. Notation
For any two positive integers
. . , a n ). We use N, N 0 , and R ≥0 to denote the set of natural numbers excluding zero, the set of natural numbers including zero, and the set of nonnegative real numbers, respectively.
II. DISTRIBUTED COVERING VIA GAME THEORY
In this section, we present the covering problem and the associated covering game. We further define the performance metric used throughout this paper and recap previous results.
A. Model
Let us consider the problem of assigning a collection of agents N = {1, . . . , n} to a finite set of resources R = {r 1 , . . . , r m } with the goal of maximizing the value of covered resources. The feasible allocations for each agent i ∈ N are the elements of the action set a i ∈ A i ⊆ 2 R , while every resource r ∈ R is associated with a nonnegative value v r ≥ 0. Observe that a i ⊆ R. The welfare of an allocation a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ A 1 × · · · × A n is measured by the total value of covered resources
where |a| r denotes the number of agents that choose resource r in allocation a. The covering problem C = {N, R, {A i } i∈N , {v r } r ∈R } consists in finding an optimal allocation, 2 that is an assignment
Given a covering problem C, we define its cardinality as the maximum number of players that can concurrently select the same resource, that is max r ∈R, a∈A |a| r .
(
Instead of directly specifying a distributed algorithm, we shift the focus to the design of local utility functions for each agent, as proposed for distributed welfare games first in [5] , [22] , and successively by [11] . Within this framework, each agent i ∈ N is associated with a utility function of the form
The function f : [n] → R ≥0 constitutes our design choice and is called distribution rule as it represents the fractional benefit an agent receives from each resource he selects. The advantages of using utilities of the form (2) are twofold. First, u i (a i , a −i ) is local as it depends only on the resources agent i selects, their value, and the number of agents that selects the same resources. Second, (2) allows to construct a distribution rule irrespective of {A i } i∈N and {v r } r ∈R so that the final design is scalable and applies to different choices of the action sets and of the resource valuations.
Given a covering problem C and a distribution rule f : [n] → R ≥0 , we consider the associated covering game G :
where A i is the set of feasible allocations and the utility of agent i ∈ N is as in (2) .
We do not aim at designing f using information on the specific instance of covering problem at hand, as such information is often not available to the system designer. Our goal is rather to construct a distribution rule that behaves well for a large class of problems. Hence, we consider the set of covering problems for which the cardinality is exactly equal to k ∈ N, k ≤ n. Given a distribution rule f : [k] → R ≥0 , we define the set of associated games as
Our objective is to design f : [k] → R ≥0 so that the efficiency of all the equilibria of games in G k f is as high as possible. Note that for fixed f , any game G is potential [22] . Hence, existence of equilibria is guaranteed and distributed algorithms, such as the best response scheme, converge to them [23] . Throughout this paper, we focus on pure Nash equilibria [24] , which we will refer to in the following definition just as equilibria.
Definition 1 (Pure Nash equilibrium): Given a game G, an allocation a e ∈ A is a pure Nash equilibrium iff
e ) for all deviations a i ∈ A i and for all players i ∈ N . In the following we use NE(G) to denote the set of Nash equilibria of G.
For a given distribution rule, we evaluate the efficiency of the Nash equilibria of games in G k f , adapting the concept of price of anarchy from [25] as
In essence, the quantity PoA(f, k) bounds the inefficiency of the worst equilibrium (and, thus, of all equilibria) over games in G k f , that is over games with distribution rule set to f and cardinality equal to k. 3 The higher the price of anarchy, the better the performance guarantees we can provide. 4 
B. Related Work and Performance Guarantees
The problem of designing a distribution rule so as to maximize PoA(f, k) has been studied in [11] and [13] . Both works impose a natural constraint on the admissible f , requiring f (1) = 1 and f : [k] → R ≥0 to be nonincreasing. The optimal distribution rule is explicitly derived in the former work, whereas the latter shows how PoA(f, k) is fully characterized by a single scalar quantity χ (f, k) defined in (4), measuring how fast the distribution rule f decreases. We intend to build upon these results, which are summarized in the following proposition. Given k and a distribution rule f , we define
Proposition 1 (see [11] and [13] ): Consider a nonincreas-
i) The price of anarchy over the class
.
ii) The price of anarchy over the class G k f is maximized for
iii) The optimal price of anarchy is a decreasing function of the cardinality k
III. CASE OF UNKNOWN CARDINALITY: A RISK-REWARD TRADEOFF When the cardinality k defining the class of games G k f is known, Proposition 1 gives a conclusive answer on which distribution rule agents should choose to achieve the best worst case performance. In spite of that, the knowledge of the exact cardinality is in many applications not available or may require excessive communications between the agents to be determined.
Motivated by this observation, we study in the following the problem of designing a distribution rule when the cardinality k defining the class of games G k f is not known, but an upper bound k ≤ k u is available. Observe that a universal upper bound for such quantity can be easily computed as the number n of agents. Potentially tighter bounds can be derived for specific applications. Our objective is to design a distribution rule f : [k u ] → R ≥0 with the best performance guarantees possible with the sole knowledge of k u . Once such a distribution rule has been designed, one can use existing distributed algorithms to find an equilibrium as discussed in the introduction. The following two natural questions arise in this context. 1) How should we select the distribution rule?
2) What performance can we guarantee?
We will show that how selecting f k u guards us against the worst case performance but will not guarantee the same efficiency of f k when k < k u . We will then present the potential benefits and risks associated with a more aggressive choice. These results motivate Section IV, where we will present a dynamic scheme that overcomes the difficulties encountered here, offering the same performances of f k at no risk.
A. Two Alternative Distributions
A natural choice when an upper bound on the cardinality is available consists in designing the distribution rule exactly at the upper bound, that is using f k u . A different choice might entail constructing a distribution rule where the entries [k d ] are designed as if the cardinality was k d < k u , whereas the remaining entries [k d + 1, k u ] are optimally filled. The latter suggestion is inspired by the observation that the optimal system level performance (measured by the price of anarchy) is a decreasing function of k as per (7) . This distribution is denoted with f k d and is constructed fixing
as a solution of the following optimization problem:
where
The next proposition characterizes explicitly (5) and (9)
where χ (f k d , k u ) is given by the following expression:
(10) The proof is reported in Appendix A. Remark: In [11] a distribution rule f was required to satisfy the constraint j ·f (j) ≤ 1 for all j. Loosely speaking, the abovementioned requirement guarantees that a distribution rule does not overpay the players, in the sense that i∈N u i (a i , a −i ) ≤ W (a) for all allocations. Observe that such constraint might be important for economic applications, but it is irrelevant in the design of engineering systems. While [11] shows that the distribution rule f k u satisfies this property, the next lemma proves that f k d also verifies this condition even if this was not requested a priori.
Lemma 1:
The proof is provided in Appendix A.
B. Performance Comparison
Based on the metric introduced in (3), we compare in this section the performance of f k u with the performance of f k d . Theorem 1 constitutes the main result of this section.
Such performance is strictly worse than the one achieved
which is strictly worse than the one achieved by f k u .
which is strictly better than the one achieved by f k u . The proof can be found in Appendix A. Remark: Claim i) in Theorem 1 shows that the performance of the distribution f k u on the class of games with cardinality 
, normalized by its largest value. As such, it describes the normalized difference in performance between f k d and f k u for various values of
equal to k is independent on the actual value of k, as for any
In each of these cases, the performance is independent on the actual value of k, but only depends on whether k d is above or below k. Loosely speaking, if we underestimate k by designing k d < k, the performance guarantees offered by f k d are worse than what f k u can achieve. The reverse holds in the case when we overestimate the cardinality as in
In Fig. 2 , we compare the performance of f k d with the performance of f k u . It is important to note that the performance degradation (incurred whenever k d < k) always dominates the potential gains (achieved when k d ≥ k). This is also exemplified in Table I and motivates Section IV, where we will introduce a dynamic algorithm capable of offering the benefits of f k without the knowledge of k.
IV. BEYOND THE RISK-REWARD TRADEOFF
Section III has focused on the design of a distribution rule when an upper bound on the true cardinality is known. We have demonstrated how f k u guards against worst case performance while f k d could give potential benefits, but comes with a certain degree of risk. In both cases the performance is equal or inferior to what we could achieve if we knew the true cardinality.
In this section, we show how to overcome such difficulties when we are given a game G ∈ G k f with unknown cardinality k. We propose a distributed and asynchronous implementation of the best response algorithm that dynamically updates which distribution rule to use. The upshot is that we guarantee an equal or superior performance to what we could achieve if we knew k.
In the following, we allow distribution rules to depend on an additional variable x r ∈ [n] defined for r ∈ R, which we will dynamically update to coordinate the agents. In particular, we generalize the utilities of (2) to
where x = {x r } r ∈R and f : [n] × [n] → R ≥0 might be different across the resources, depending on the value of x r . One could question whether the improved performance we will obtain comes from the additional degree of freedom introduced allowing resource specific distribution rules. Nevertheless, the author in [11] shows that it is not the case, in that the best resource specific and non resource specific distribution perform equally (in the worst case sense). The only rationale to introduce resource dependent rules is the distributability of the algorithm. Indeed, similar results could have been achieved dynamically by updating a single distribution rule shared by all resources, but such algorithm would have not been distributed.
A. Algorithm Description and Distributedness
In the following, t ∈ N 0 describes the time step of the algorithm and a t ∈ A the corresponding allocation. With slight abuse of notation, for every resource r ∈ R we introduce the quantity x r (t) that associates r ∈ R to the maximum number of agents that chose such resource until time t ∈ N 0 . Furthermore, we define f alg :
[n] → R ≥0 for every ∈ N as a distribution rule 5 matching the optimal in (5) for j ∈ [ ] and constant in between [ , n]
The algorithm is described in its entirety in the following table. Through the additional variable x r (t), the algorithm keeps track of the maximum number of players that visited every resource until the current time t, and selects consequently a resource specific distribution rule. In particular, on every r ∈ R, the algorithm uses f alg with set to the maximum number of players that visited that resource until time t (lines 4 and 6). Following a round-robin rotation, player i is selected to best respond and to update the allocation (lines 3 to 5). The procedure repeats until convergence. 6 The algorithm is distributed in the sense that every agent needs to keep track of x r (t) only for those resources he has access to, i.e., for r ∈ A i . Furthermore, it is asynchronous as 5 The rule f alg is a valid distribution rule, being nonincreasing and such that f alg (1) = 1. It will in general not satisfy j · f alg (j) ≤ 1, but this was neither requested nor has relevance in the design of engineering systems. 6 Note that the best response strategy is not guaranteed to be unique. To overcome this issue, in the following we assume the existence of a tie-breaking rule selecting a single optimal allocation, these should be multiple. Nevertheless, we observe that neither this nor requiring players to best respond in a roundrobin is fundamental. It is still possible to show that Algorithm 1 converges almost surely if the players best responding are uniformly randomly selected from [n] and a single optimal allocation is uniformly randomly extracted from the set of best responses. This will produce a totally asynchronous algorithm. 
t ← t + 1 8: end while players need not to update their allocation in a specified order, but can spontaneously revise their strategies (see footnote 6). It is important to highlight that the communication requirements of Algorithm 1 are the same as of those needed by the best response algorithm applied for instance to distribution rules f k u or f k d . That is, Algorithm 1 better exploits the information that is already available.
In Fig. 3 , we compare the distribution f k with f
, where x ∞ r = lim t→∞ x r (t). We exemplify such comparison for some of the allowed values
For the ease of exposition, we have presented the case where the distribution rules depend on the history x r (t), but the same across the players. It is simple to extend these results to the case of agent specific distribution rules. Every player would use resource specific distribution rules that depend on the maximum number of players that visited every resource up until his last visit. Similar convergence guarantees and performance certificates will follow.
B. Convergence and Quality of Equilibria
The following theorem is the main result of this section. Claim i) shows convergence of Algorithm 1 to a Nash equilibrium. Claim ii) proves that the quality of such equilibrium is higher or equal to what the optimal distribution f k could achieve.
Theorem 2: Consider a covering game G with cardinality k. 
where a o ∈ arg max a∈A W (a) 
C. Instance by Instance Analysis
Theorem 2 shows that Algorithm 1 achieves a higher or equal worst case performance than the optimal distribution f k . While worst case analysis has been and still is a fruitful tool to measure and improve on algorithms' performance, the computer science community has recently showed interest in moving beyond it [26] . Inspired by this, the question arises as to whether Algorithm 1 performs better than f k , instance by instance. More formally, we would like to understand if Algorithm 1 yields higher welfare than the optimally designed rule on all the remaining instances (the non worst case ones). We show that neither this nor the converse holds.
Theorem 3: Let C be an instance of covering problem defined in Section II. Furthermore, denote with NE alg (C) the set of equilibria obtained using Algorithm 1 on C and G = {C, f k } the associated game where the optimal distribution f k has been selected.
1) There exists an instance C of the covering problem such that
2) There exists an instance C of the covering problem such that
The proof is constructive and is presented in Appendix A. Note that both statements in Theorem 3 compare the performances of a given covering problem C and the associated game G . Observe that this metric is significantly different from (3), where we additionally take the infimum over problems with cardinality equal to k.
V. SIMULATIONS
In this section, we provide simulations to compare the performance of different distribution rules.
For this numerical study, we consider the problem of distributed data caching introduced in [27] as a technique to reduce peak traffic in mobile data networks. In order to alleviate the growing radio congestion caused by the recent surge of mobile data traffic, the latter work suggested to store popular and spectrum intensive items (such as movies or songs) in geographically distributed stations. The question we seek to answer is how to distribute the popular items across the nodes of a network so as to maximize the total number of queries fulfilled. More in details, we consider a square grid of 800 × 800 bins and a set of geographically distributed agents N (the stations) with position P i . Additionally, we consider a set R of data items, where each item has query rate q r and is also geographically distributed with position O r . The allocation set of agents i is A i ⊆ 2 R i , where R i are the set of resources r ∈ R that are sufficiently close to the considered station. Formally, R i = {r ∈ R s.t. ||O r − P i || ≤ ρ}. In addition, we require that |a i | ≤ l i for all a i ∈ A i as the storage capacity is limited in each station. The goal is to select a feasible allocation on every station so as to jointly maximize the number of queries fulfilled, i.e.,
In the following, we consider |N | = 150, |R| = 1500, ρ = 50, and l i = 10 for all i. Data items are randomly located in the grid (with uniform distribution), while the corresponding query rates follow the Zipf distribution 7 q r = 1/r α with α = 0.6. The stations are uniformly distributed, on the grid. All the instances considered have cardinality k = 3. We considered 5 · 10 4 instances of this problem, and for every instance we computed an equilibrium allocation using the best response algorithm in conjunction with f k d , f k u , f k or Algorithm 1. Given the size of the problem, it is not possible to compute the optimal allocation and, thus, the price of anarchy. As a surrogate for the latter, we use the ratio between W (a e ) and W tot , where W tot = r ∈R q r is the total value of queries. This ratio provides a lower bound for the true price of anarchy as W (a o ) ≤ W tot . Observe that W tot is constant throughout any instance considered as W tot = r ≤1500 1/r α . Thus, it is possible to compare the performance across different instances by looking at W (a e )/W tot .
In Fig. 4 (top) , we compare the empirical distribution of the ratio W (a e )/W tot for the rules that use no information about the true cardinality, i.e., f k d , f k u for k d = 2 and k u = 5. In Fig. 4 (bottom) , we compare the performance of the worst case optimal distribution f k with that of our learning Algorithm 1. The worst case ratio W (a e )/W tot ever encountered for each case is shown in Fig. 4 with a marker and is also reported in Table II. Additionally, in Table II , we show the maximum, minimum, and average number of best response rounds. 8 7 Query rates approximately follow this distribution, as shown in [28] . 8 Observe that in each best response round all the agents have a chance to update their allocation. 
TABLE II PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
First, we note that all the tested algorithms require a comparable number of best response rounds, and, thus, have very similar running time. Second, we observe that f k d performs the worst among all the other distributions, both in terms of worst case performance, and in terms of average performance. Additionally, we note that Algorithm 1 and the distribution rules f k u , f k perform similarly, when looking at an average instance, whereas f k and Algorithm 1 outperform f k u in terms of worst case performance with a slight advantage for Algorithm 1. The efficiency values are much higher compared to the analytical worst case, hinting at the fact that such instances are very few. Given that the average performance is similar but the distribution f k u is proven to have inferior worst case performance (Theorem 1), one might want to use either the optimal distribution f k or Algorithm 1. Recall indeed that the worst case performance of Algorithm 1 is on par or better to f k (Theorem 2). Nevertheless, the use of f k requires knowledge of the cardinality k, whereas the algorithm proposed does not.
To conclude: Algorithm 1 achieves similar average performances compared to f k , but has a better worst case performance than f k u and a better-equal worst case performance than f k even if it does not require the knowledge of k.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied how additional information impacts the optimal design of local utility functions when the goal is to improve the overall efficiency of a class of multiagent systems.
Relative to covering problems, in the first part of this paper we highlighted an inherent tradeoff between potential risks and rewards when such additional information is uncertain. In the second part, we showed how it is possible to fully eliminate the risks by using a distributed algorithm that dynamically updated the local utility functions. The methodology used suggests that similar results could be obtained for a broader class of resource allocation problems than the one studied here.
APPENDIX A
In the proofs presented in Appendix A, we make use of Lemmas 2-5. Their presentation and proof is deferred to Appendix B.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
Thanks to result i) in Proposition 1, maximizing PoA(f, k u ) is equivalent to minimizing χ (f, k u ) and f k d can be computed by the following linear program (LP) in the unknowns
We remove the constraints x ≥ 0, f ∈ F as well as jf
and introduce the following relaxed LP:
The proof is divided in the following two subproofs. 1) We show that a solution to the relaxed program (15) is given by (9) and (10). 2) We show that the solution to the relaxed program obtained in i) is feasible for the original problem too. Proof: 1) The proof proceeds by showing that a solution of (15) can be obtained transforming all the inequality constraint into equalities. This will produce the expressions (9) and (10) .
Let us define
With these definitions, the LP (15) is equivalent to the following, where we have removed the decision variables that are already determined:
Thanks to the convexity of the cost function and to the polytopic constraints, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality [29] . Consequently, a feasible point
where we used ∇J to indicate ∇J(x , v k d +1 , . . . , v k u ) and similarly for g i , ∇g i . Observe that the distribution rule in (9) and the corresponding χ (f k d , k u ) in (10) are the unique solution of the linear system
Primal feasibility and complementarity slackness are, hence, naturally satisfied. We are only left to prove that there exists
μ i ∇g i = 0. We proceed by writing the stationarity conditions explicitly and show that this is indeed the case. Note that both the cost function and the constraints are linear so that their derivatives are constant functions ∇J = (1, 0, . . . , 0)
. . .
Solving the stationarity condition in a recursive fashion starting from last component gives
Substituting the first equation into the second one and solving
, we conclude that (9) and (10) solve the relaxed program (15) .
Proof:
2) The proof proceeds by showing that (9) and (10) satisfy the constraints removed when transforming the original program (14) into (15) .
Using (10) and (9), it is trivial to verify that χ (
which was proven to be nonincreasing in [11] . Furthermore, from Lemma 2 we know that
We are left to show that
the price of anarchy is a monotonically decreasing function (Proposition 1). Finally, Lemma 3 shows that for any
. It follows that f k d is feasible for the original problem (14) .
Thanks to this and to the fact that f k d is optimal for (15), we conclude that f k d is a solution of the original problem.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof: The result of Lemma 2 implies that for all
Furthermore, we know from [11] 
and we already know that the optimal distribution f k d does not overpay the players [11] .
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: i) Thanks to Proposition 1, the performance of f k u on the class of games with cardinality k can be computed as
This means that the performance of f k u on the set of games with cardinality k is the same performance of the distribution f k u on the set of games with cardinality k u ≥ k, and
where the last inequality holds since PoA(f k , k) is a decreasing function of k as seen in part iii) of Proposition 1. The inequality is tight if and
. The performance of f k d on the class of games with cardinality k can be computed as PoA
, we apply part ii) of Lemma 4 to conclude that
, the performance of f k d in the class of games with cardinality k is the same as of the performance in the class of games with cardinality k u , i.e., PoA(
. Finally, by Lemma 3, we conclude that such performance is worse than what f k u can offer
only the first k entries of f k d will determine the performance and these are identical
and part i) of Lemma 4 applies
so that f k d has the same performance of f k d . Using the fact that the optimal price of anarchy is a decreasing function, for any
The inequality is tight if and only if p = k u .
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: 1) Consider x r (t) for fixed r ∈ R. The integer sequence {x r (t)} ∞ t=0 is upper bounded by the true cardinality k (by definition of cardinality) and is nondecreasing in t, thanks to its update rule (line 6 in Algorithm 1). Hence, after a finite number of steps, x r (t) has converged to x ∞ r . Repeating the same reasoning for all the resources, r ∈ R shows that the map x r (t) converges in a finite numbert of steps. Hence, for t ≥t the distribution rule used in the algorithm is fixed. Consequently, the game is potential as it can be formulated as a standard congestion game [11] , [23] . Since for t ≥t agents are playing round-robin best response on a potential game, their strategy will converge in a finite number of steps to a Nash equilibrium of the game with resource specific distribution rules fixed to f alg x ∞ r for r ∈ R. 2) Let us define k e = max r ∈R |a e | r (note that in general k e = k M ). To ease the notation, in the following we will simply use f (x r , |a| r ) to indicate f 
Using the definition of payoff, the first term can be rewritten as With a similar manipulation, the second term becomes 
The second term in (17) can, thus, be lower bounded by
Substituting (18) and (19) in (17) gives (20) where we have used the fact that f (x r , 1) = 1 for all resources. We intend to bound the first and the third term in the last expression. In the summands of (20) 
(21) Similarly for the third term in (20) 
Hence, combining (20) with the bounds from (21) and (22), we get
Hence,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that the price of anarchy is a decreasing function, and k M ≤ k by definition of cardinality.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: 1) Consider the covering problem depicted in the following figure (a), composed of players p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 represented by a solid dot; resources r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , and r 4 represented by a circle with values v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , and v 4 such that
As an example, take v = (11, 5, 7, 6) . Each player p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 can choose only one resource from {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }, {r 2 , r 3 , r 4 }, and {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , r 4 }, respectively, i.e., each player can only choose one arrow pointing outward from himself.
The cardinality is k = 3 since all players could choose simultaneously r 2 or r 3 , hence, the optimal distribution rule is f 3 . Amongst the equilibria obtained with f 3 there is a e = (r 2 , r 3 , r 1 ), depicted in the previous figure (b) . This configuration is an equilibrium since 4 . Such equilibrium gives a welfare of v 1 + v 2 + v 3 that is less than the optimal v 1 + v 3 + v 4 , since v 2 < v 4 . We intend to show that for any initial condition and for any execution Algorithm 1 will converge to an optimal allocation. This suffices to prove that the worst equilibrium obtained with Algorithm 1 performs better than the worst equilibrium obtained with f 3 , which is not optimal as shown earlier. Observe that the conditions (2) ensure that an allocation with two or more agents covering the same resource is never an equilibrium. This holds regardless of the distribution used. Hence, the welfare can potentially take ( 4 . Similarly for any feasible permutation of (r 1 , r 2 , r 4 ), the player selecting resource r 4 can always improve moving to r 3 . The allocation (r 2 , r 3 , r 4 ) is never an equilibrium since player p 3 can improve moving to r 1 since v 1 is the highest. Similarly, for any feasible permutation of (r 2 , r 3 , r 4 ), there exists a player that can improve moving to r 1 . This holds regardless of what distribution rule is used. The allocation (r 1 , r 3 , r 4 ) (or any feasible permutation) is optimal. We are, thus, left to show that Algorithm 1 never converges to (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) or any other feasible permutation. We show this by enumeration.
The allocation (r 1 , r 2 , r 3 ) cannot be an equilibrium since player p 2 can improve moving to r 4 because v 4 > v 2 . The allocation (r 1 , r 3 , r 2 ) cannot be an equilibrium since player p 3 can improve moving to r 4 . The allocation (r 3 , r 2 , r 1 ) cannot be an equilibrium since player p 2 can improve moving to r 4 . We are left to check a e = (r 2 , r 3 , r 1 ), depicted in the previous figure (b). This cannot be an equilibrium of Algorithm 1 because v 2 < v 1 f alg (2) for l = 1, 2 and so player p 2 could improve moving to r 1 . The fact that the algorithm uses l ≤ 2 on resource r 1 holds because the maximum number of players on r 1 is two, and so k t (1) ≤ 2 at any time step t ∈ [n]. We conclude that all the equilibria toward which the algorithm converges give optimal welfare, whereas f 3 also produces the suboptimal equilibrium a e ; the claim follows. Observe that this is not a worst case instance because the price of anarchy with the example values v = (11, 5, 7, 6 2) Consider the covering problem depicted in the following figure (a), composed of players p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 represented by a solid dot; resources r 1 , r 2 , and r 3 represented by an empty circle with values v 1 , v 2 , and v 3 such that v 3 f 3 (2) < v 1 < v 2 < v 3 /2 < v 3 .
As an example, take v = [9, 9.5, 20] . Each player p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 can choose only one resource from {r 1 , r 2 }, {r 2 , r 3 }, and {r 1 , r 2 , r 3 }, respectively, i.e., each player can only choose one arrow pointing outward from himself.
The cardinality is k = 3 since all players could choose simultaneously r 1 , hence, the optimal distribution rule is f 3 . All the equilibria obtained with f 3 are completely spread, i.e., they feature one and only one player on each resource. Any allocation where there are two or more players in one resource is not an equilibrium for f 3 In conclusion, all equilibria obtained with f 3 give a better welfare than a 2 and, thus, of the worst equilibrium obtained with Algorithm 1.
ii) We intend to compute
